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This article reports primary archival data on the colonial penal history of British India 
and its reconfiguration into the postcolonial Indian state. It introduces criminologists 
to frameworks through which postcolonial scholars have sought to make sense of 
the continuities and discontinuities of rule across the colonial/postcolonial divide. 
The article examines the postcolonial life of one example of colonial penal power, 
known as the criminal tribes policy, under which more than three million Indian 
subjects of British rule were restricted in their movements, subject to a host of 
administrative rules and sometimes severe punishments, sequestered in settlements 
and limited in access to legal redress. It illustrates how at the birth of the 
postcolonial Indian state, encompassing visions of a liberal, unfettered and free life 
guaranteed in a new Constitution and charter of Fundamental Rights, freedom for 





けIデ ｷゲ ゲデｷﾉﾉ ┌ﾐ┌ゲ┌;ﾉげが ┘ヴﾗデW デｴW ;ﾐデｴヴﾗヮﾗﾉﾗｪｷゲデ PWデWヴ PWﾉゲが けaﾗヴ ヴWゲW;ヴIｴWヴゲ デﾗ a┌ﾉﾉ┞ 
escape the dichotomy of colonial state and oppressed and/or resistant others, and 
デﾗ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐS ｴﾗ┘ ﾏ┌Iｴ Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ WﾏヮｷヴWゲ ┘WヴW aヴ;ｪﾏWﾐデWS H┞ ﾗデｴWヴ デWﾐゲｷﾗﾐゲげ 
(1997: 176). In a literature replete with binaries に of metropole and colony, colonizer 
and colonized, elite and subaltern, and, perhaps finally, colonial and postcolonial 
state に it is possible to imagine the actors so denoted should hold some emphatic 
power of perspective (taking, making, changing), giving force and definitive character 
to each side of the binary divide over which they are ordered. In this article I use a 
case study of the articulations of penal power in India in the years preceding and 
then immediately following independence in 1947 to examine the continuities and 
disruptions of governance over the colonial/postcolonial divide. For while the new 
postcolonial states of India and Pakistan were wracked by ethnic and religious 
violence at the very moment they gained their freedom, and while it is that violence 
and subsequent eruptions of nationalist passion that gain attention (such as the 
border wars fought between India and Pakistan, the dissolution of the bifurcated 
Pakistani state and the dispute over Kashmir), in penal governance terms at least the 
colonial/postcolonial divide was marked not by disruption but indeed by an 
impressive continuity of practice and purpose. 
 
In considering how this came to be, the article seeks to develop the idea and carve 
out a space for the study of postcolonial penality. The absence of attention to this 
area might be added it to the list of けIヴｷﾏｷﾐﾗﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ HﾉｷﾐS ゲヮﾗデゲげ ﾐﾗデｷIWS H┞ K;デﾃ; 
Franko Aas (2007: 297) as the discipline elides major global and historical processes 
in favour of a kind of fetishization of the domestic now. This ;ヴデｷIﾉWげゲ Wﾐｪ;ｪWﾏWﾐデ 
┘ｷデｴ IﾐSｷ;げゲ ヮﾗゲデIﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ﾏﾗﾏWﾐデ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ヴWquire connecting with a number of 
contemporary debates over the character of western intervention in what we now 
term the global south. Included here are questions of historical legacy, and 
particularly the question of whether contemporary political and international 
development challenges (corruption, patronage, big-man politics, sectarian/tribal 
looting of the state via participation in democratic politics, enduring tribal 
internecine warfare and so on) can be sheeted home to the legacies of colonialism. 
The temper of this debate is reflected ｷﾐ Jﾗ┞ Aゲﾗﾐｪ;┣ﾗｴ AﾉWﾏ;┣┌ﾐｪげゲ (2010: 65) 
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argument in respect of Africa デｴ;デ けIﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ｷﾏヮ;Iデゲ ﾗﾐ ヮﾗゲデ-Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ゲデ;デWゲ ｷﾐ AaヴｷI;げ 
must HW ┌ﾐSWヴゲデﾗﾗS け;ゲ Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ﾉWｪ;IｷWゲく “ﾗﾏW ﾗa デｴWゲW ﾉWｪ;IｷWゲ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWぎ ﾐWﾗ-
patrimonialism and clientelism, neo-colonialism (continuity in continuation of 
wWゲデWヴﾐ Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉ ;ﾐS Sﾗﾏｷﾐ;ﾐIWぶが ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ;ヴｷ;ﾐｷゲﾏが WデｴﾐｷI Sｷ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ヴｷ┗;ﾉヴ┞げ (see 
also Mamdani, 1996, below). Indeed, it is precisely the long shadow of colonialism, 
together with the nepotism of the ruling elites who replaced it, that for Alemazung 
(2010: 64) ﾉ;ヴｪWﾉ┞ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐゲ デｴW ヮヴWゲWヴ┗;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa AaヴｷI; ;ゲ け; ヮﾗﾗヴ ;ﾐS SW┗;ゲデ;デWS 
region of the globeげく Colonialism can be reprised in other ways also. Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-N;げｷﾏ ふヲヰヱンぎ ヱΓΑぶが aﾗヴ ｷﾐゲデ;ﾐIWが ;ヴｪ┌Wゲ ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ ヴWゲヮWIデ デｴ;デ けデヴ;ﾐゲｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ 
justice scholarship and strategies are neocolonial because they view indigenous 
IﾗﾐIWヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ﾃ┌ゲデｷIW ;ゲ ; Sｷゲデヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ｪヴ;ﾐS さﾏﾗSWヴﾐｷ┣ｷﾐｪざ ﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
Nﾗヴデｴ Aデﾉ;ﾐデｷI ゲﾗIｷWデｷWゲげく  
 
In engaging with these critiques of colonial rule this article examines the virtues and 
limitations of a particular vision and instance of colonialism, approached through the 
nested case studies of, firstly, British rule in India and, secondly, the governance of 
crime and marginal social orders across the colonial/postcolonial divide. It is 
therefore a study not so much ﾗa ┘ｴ;デ Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉｷゲﾏ けSｷSげ H┌デ ﾏﾗヴW ゲﾗ of what it 
changed and what it left behind, in the sense of what became possible and was 
thought desirable when the open horizon of postcolonial statehood lay before the 
ﾐW┘ IﾐSｷ;ﾐ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげゲ governing classes. It thus goes directly to the question of 
whether an anti-colonial movement born in the pursuit of freedom and liberty would 
be able to achieve the rupture in penal practices that such goals require and, if not, 
quite why. 
 
The specific case to be examined here is the last years of what many view as a most 
egregious piece of colonial policy and legislation, the Criminal Tribes Act 1924, and 
its post-1947 replacement, but effectively also its rehabilitation and extension, 
within a new postcolonial grammar of habitual offender law. As the case study here 
will illustrate, the governmental project of managing these problematic individuals 
and communities in fact spanned the artificial divide of colonial state and 
independent nation, where the latter was supposed to usher in a new, distinctive, 
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postcolonial era. This era was conceived as a time in which, as Jawaharlal Nehru 
proposed in his famous Tryst With Destiny speech on the eve of independence in 
A┌ｪ┌ゲデ ヱΓヴΑが けIﾐSｷ; ┘ｷﾉﾉ ;┘;ﾆW デﾗ ﾉｷaW ;ﾐS aヴWWSﾗﾏ ぐ ┘ｴWﾐ ┘W ゲデWヮ ﾗ┌デ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ﾗﾉS 
デﾗ デｴW ﾐW┘が ┘ｴWﾐ ;ﾐ ;ｪW WﾐSゲ ぐ デｴW ヮ;ゲデ ｷゲ ﾗ┗Wヴ ;ﾐS ｷデ ｷゲ デhe future that beckons to 
┌ゲ ﾐﾗ┘げ (Nehru, 1947). Quite why freedom for some was to prove as elusive as 
citizens as it had been as subjects is a question this article aims to address.  
 
The remainder of the article is divided into five sections. The first sets out the 
theoretical framework within which a study of postcolonial penality will be 
grounded. It ranges from seminal work on Africa to the notion of postcolonial 
legalities and on デﾗ デｴW ﾏﾗヴW ヴWIWﾐデ ｷSW; ﾗa デｴW けW┗Wヴ┞S;┞ ゲデ;デWげ ;ゲ ; ┘;┞ ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ デﾗ 
problematize the binary of colonial vs. postcolonial rule but so too to emphasize the 
precarious contingency of postcolonial citizenship. Section two will describe the 
history and character of the criminal tribes policy and amendments and extensions 
to its enabling legislation, bringing it to the point of the present case study in the late 
1940s when, by various estimates, somewhere between three and 13 million Indians 
were subject to penal control and restricted access to law under its provisions.
1
 
Section three presents the case of efforts in local and central government between 
1937 and 1947 to amend or dispense with the Act and a detailed analysis of the 1951 
Report of the Criminal Tribes Act Enquiry Committee, a body established in 1949 to 
investigate this instrument of colonial oppression developed within the pre-history 
ﾗa デｴW IﾐSｷ;ﾐ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐが ﾗヴ ┘ｴ;デ NWｴヴ┌ SWゲIヴｷHWS ;ゲ デｴW けヮWヴｷﾗS ﾗa ｷﾉﾉ aﾗヴデ┌ﾐWげ ふNehru, 
1947). Here it will be observed that in fact far from dispensing with or dismantling 
this leg of the colonial penal apparatus, both local governments
2
 and the Enquiry 
Committee alike envisaged a need to expanded its remit. Not only did they propose 
an almost identical apparatus for the new nation state, albeit with some finessing of 
language and recognition of the notionally changed political status of those who 
would fall within its purview, but they also chose to embrace it within the general 
body of law rather than to leave it, as colonial governments had, as a piece of 
exceptional and extraordinary legislation. Section four returns to the notion of the 
everyday state as a potentially useful theoretical frame for understanding these 
features of postcolonial penality in India. Finally then, the article will conclude with 
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some thoughts on how sense can be made of all this and デｴW ゲデ┌S┞げゲ ｷﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ ｷﾐ 
light of contemporary diagnoses that it is liberal institutions and visions that fragile, 
post-conflict and generally postcolonial states require in order to secure the safety, 
freedom and prosperity of their citizens. 
 
Postcolonial penality: Continuities, legalities ;ﾐS デｴW けW┗Wヴ┞S;┞ ゲデ;デWげ 
 
The question of what could be expected of postcolonial states is a vexed one. In the 
wake of the Second World War European powers that since the 17
th
 century had 
slowly but progressively colonised the regions of Asia and Africa now began rapid 
decolonization. Many colonial regimes in Africa were still relatively new and 
European tenure there ｴ;S HWWﾐが デﾗ ヴWSWヮﾉﾗ┞ HﾗHHWゲげゲ a;ﾏﾗ┌ゲ WヮｷデｴWデ ﾗa ﾉｷaW 
outside political community, nasty brutish and short. That many post-independence 
governments and leaders in Africa would turn out to be equally or even more savage 
and venal has given rise to intense debate as to how this could have come to pass. 
Alemazung (2010) and An-N;げｷﾏ ふヲヰヱンぶ IｷデWS W;ヴﾉｷWヴ Hﾗデｴ reflect elements of 
M;ｴﾏﾗﾗS M;ﾏS;ﾐｷげゲ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ claims here. Mamdani (1996: 285) posits that it was 
the dual and oppositional structure of colonial governance and legal orders in Africa 
デｴ;デ ゲWデ デｴW ゲWWSゲ aﾗヴ ヮﾗゲデIﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ a;ｷﾉ┌ヴW ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ﾐW┘ ゲデ;デWゲ ゲﾗ ﾗaデWﾐ けゲ┌II┌ﾏHWS 
to caprice and terror on the ﾏﾗヴヴﾗ┘ ﾗa ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIWげ. Whether these new states 
sought to redress problems of urban/rural governance or to settle problems of 
ヴｷ┗;ﾉﾉｷﾐｪ WデｴﾐｷIｷデｷWゲが WｷデｴWヴ ┘;┞が ｴW ;ヴｪ┌Wゲが デｴW┞ デWﾐSWS デﾗ けゲﾗaデWﾐ ﾗﾐW ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴW 
legacy wｴｷﾉW W┝;IWヴH;デｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾗデｴWヴげ ふM;ﾏS;ﾐｷ, 1996: 26). The result: considerable 
continuities in the oppressive character of rule over the colonial/postcolonial divide. 
 
Outside of Africa and with particular reference to the longer standing and 
undeniably more liberal models of governance employed on the Indian 
subcontinent, Upendra Baxi (2000: 541) has analysed the development of what he 
terms postcolonial legalities. His attention is drawn to constitutionalism as a defining 
feature of efforts of many ヮﾗゲデIﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ゲデ;デWゲ デﾗ SWﾏ;ヴI;デW ; ﾆｷﾐS ﾗa けｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI 
r┌ヮデ┌ヴWげ ﾗa ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIWく Tｴ┌ゲが ┘ｴWヴW;ゲ M;ﾏS;ﾐｷげゲ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷゲWゲ how new 
AaヴｷI;ﾐ ゲデ;デWゲげ efforts to escape the colonial dispensation so often led to them 
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immediately reproducing important parts of it, Baxi (2000: 542) suggests that 
postcolonial constitutions mark at least an attempted paradigm shift, experienced 
even as ontological rebirth, a Iﾉ;ｷﾏ けデﾗ ゲWﾉa-determination not warranted by imperial 
legalit┞げく YWデ けヮ;デｴﾗﾉﾗｪｷWゲ ﾗa ヮﾗ┘Wヴげ ふB;┝ｷが ヲヰヰヰぎ 551) inherent within the practice of 
postcolonial constitutionalism tend also toward a reproduction of certain forms of 
class and social order. Here, newly independent elites quickly recuperate not only 
the visible trappings of colonialism but so too ｷデゲ ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ;ﾐ┝ｷWデｷWゲく けIn many a 
societyげが B;┝ｷ (2000: 551) argues, けデｴW H┌ﾉﾆ ;ﾐS ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa ヮﾗゲデIﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ さIｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲざ 
;ヴW ｴ;ヮﾉWゲゲ ┗ｷIデｷﾏゲ ﾗa さｪﾗ┗Wヴﾐ;ﾐIWざ HW┞ﾗﾐS デｴW ヮ;ﾉW ﾗa ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞げ. The law also 
and importantly seems much less amenable to the kind of ontological renovation 
sought in postcolonial constitutionalism itself. As Baxi observes and a number of 
other scholars have elaborated, colonial ﾉ;┘げゲ ヴWヮヴessive tendencies have been 
retained and even innovated upon within new post-independence discourses of 
security. Nasser Husain (2003) has illustrated this with respect to the doctrine of 
emergency in British India, drawing to attention a colonial jurisprudence from within 
which postcolonial statesげ ヴWヮヴWゲゲｷﾗﾐゲ find support. Anil Kalhan (2010; Kalhan, 
Conroy, Kaushal, Miller and Rakoff, 2006) has traced these claims to emergency 
powers and extra-constitutional rule through the modern history of India and 
Pakistan while, in a similar fashion, Jinee Lokaneeta (2011) has examined practices of 
torture in the new India.  Delimitations upon rights, we are left to conclude, are not 
solely the preserve of the colonial state.  
 
Yet for as much as the work of Mamdani, Baxi and others brings us closer to 
recognising the inherent limitations of postcolonial statehood it is relatively silent on 
one important matter. This is the question as to how ヮﾗゲデIﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ゲデ;デWゲげ mimetic 
tendency に a tendency toward けデｴW ヴeproduction, with a range of variationげ of 
discourses and practices of colonial governance (Baxi, 2000: 544) に singles out 
particular individuals or groups for such treatment and the form of the settlements 
reached thereafter. In the last decade or so, however, a small literature has begun to 
emerge tracing the fractures that separated these grand narratives of postcolonial 
statehood from the lived experiences of individuals who, to use the title of Sherman, 
Gﾗ┌ﾉS ;ﾐS Aﾐゲ;ヴｷげゲ ふヲヰヱヴぶ ヴWIWﾐデ IﾗﾉﾉWIデｷﾗﾐが ｴad been overnight transformed From 
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Subjects to Citizens. Their collection is part of this wider attempt to examine what is 
デWヴﾏWS デｴW けW┗Wヴ┞S;┞ ゲデ;デWげ ふゲWW ;ﾉゲﾗが F┌ﾉﾉWヴ ;ﾐS BWﾐWｷが ヲヰヰヰき WｴｷデWが ヲヰヱンぶが ┘ｴｷIｴ 
デｴW┞ SWゲIヴｷHW ;ゲ けデｴW ┗;ヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ H┞ ┘ｴｷIｴ Wlite ideologies and institutions are 
interpreted, translated and manipulated at the quotidian level by men and women 
as デｴW┞ ﾐWｪﾗデｷ;デW デｴWｷヴ ﾉｷ┗Wゲげ ふ“ｴWヴﾏ;ﾐが Gﾗ┌ﾉS ;ﾐS Aﾐゲ;ヴｷが 2014: 1). 
 
One example of this approach is EﾉW;ﾐﾗヴ NW┘Hｷｪｷﾐげゲ ふヲヰヱヴ) study of the way Hindu 
and Muslim communities in colonial and postcolonial India negotiated the shape and 
parameters of the personal religious laws that should apply to them. While the rights 
concerned here are clearly of a different order to those of individuals or groups 
subject to security measures, the example is interesting for it reminds us that not all 
power is repressive and nor is its articulation beyond the influence of actors whether 
subaltern or elite, citizens or subjects. Since colonial government had from its 
earliest times marked out the private domestic and religious sphere as a domain of 
non-interference (see Duncan and Derrett, 1961; Lariviere, 1989), much of the 
structure of rights and liberties that attached to individual lives, for men versus 
women, individuals versus families, religious versus civil tribunals, and so on, were 
determined in this process of shaping the scope of personal laws. That in the 
postcolonial period different religious communities continued to be governed by 
different personal laws, laws that distributed rights in markedly different ways, 
attests to the way in which the supposedly universalising principles of secular 
Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲｴｷヮ ヴWaﾉWIデWS ｷﾐ デｴW ヱΓヵヰ Cﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐげゲ F┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ ‘ｷｪｴデゲ ┘WヴW ;ﾉ┘;┞ゲ 
mediated at the point of practical connection between the state and its various 
citizen-subjects and their equally various communities. 
 
Much of the everyday state literature therefore points toward this mediated feature 
of citizenship in the postcolonial state. Even if new postcolonial states represented 
themselves in terms of abstract principles, as embodied in the Indian Fundamental 
Rights, in practice there were both strong continuities across the 
colonial/postcolonial divide and strong tendencies for the state to view its subjects 
in communal terms. On this point Newbigin (2014: 37) ﾏ;ﾆWゲ ; けヮﾉW;げ aﾗヴ ｪヴW;デWヴ 
ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ けデｴ;デ ヱヵ A┌ｪ┌ゲデが ヱΓヴΑ SｷS ﾐﾗデ ﾏ;ヴﾆ ; tabula rasa in InSｷ;ﾐゲげ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ 
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┘ｷデｴ デｴW ゲデ;デWが H┌デ デｴ;デ ヮWﾗヮﾉWげゲ ┗ｷW┘ゲ ﾗa ;ﾐS ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ デﾗ ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲｴｷヮ 
were deeply shaped by pre-existing debateゲ ;ﾐS ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWゲげ. It is to some of 
those pre-existing debates and structures that we now turn. 
 
Penal power and colonial rule: The Criminal Tribes Acts 
 
Critics of empire have tended to grasp at bold instances of colonial violence in their 
analyses of colonial rule. In the Indian context, events attracting attention have 
included the Thuggee campaign of the 1830s (see Sleeman, 1836; Wagner, 2009), or 
the notorious Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919 (Collett, 2006). The criminal tribes 
policy is much less well known, but its operation spanned the years from 1871 until 
after independence and its reach, taking in first hundreds, then thousands, then 
millions of Indians, was as impressive as the draconian limitations upon personal 
freedom and movement it provided for.
3
 It thus stands as a useful example of the 
routine and increasingly anodyne measures of illiberal control that were at once 
peripheral yet also indispensible to colonial governance and that, presumably, would 
quickly be removed under a new, independent, postcolonial dispensation. Indeed, 
no lesser figure than Jawaharlal Nehru himself had singled out the Criminal Tribes 
Act for particular mention, describing in a 1936 speech the AIデげゲ けﾏﾗﾐゲデヴﾗ┌ゲ 
ヮヴﾗ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐゲげ as け; ﾐWｪ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Iｷ┗ｷﾉ ﾉｷHWヴデ┞ ぐ ﾗ┌デ ﾗa Iﾗﾐゲﾗﾐ;ﾐIW with all civilised 
ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉWゲげ (IｷデWS ｷﾐ Dげ“ﾗ┌┣;が ヲヰヰヱぎ ヵΑ). 
 
The Act and its targets 
 
The Act was originally directed at a combination of itinerant communities who in 
their travels were thought also to dabble in various sorts of petty crime, as well as 
certain settled communities that, on the other hand, frequently decamped on what 
were believed to be thieving expeditions. Between them they created particular 
problems of internal cross-border policing. Measures to prosecute and punish these 
groups existed under the Indian Penal Code 1860 and Code of Criminal Procedure 
1861, but they were seldom used due to the difficulty of gathering sufficient 
evidence of the supposed misconduct. Acute pressure therefore developed during 
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the late 1860s for more easily accessed powers to restrict movement, force 
settlement and induce tribes and communities to take up sedentary agricultural 
forms of life and livelihood. Most of the tribes and communities concerned were 
either outcast or very low in the social hierarchy and so the problems they posed can 
be understood also in terms of the problems of governing the social margins of 
Indian society. 
 
The origins of the criminal tribes policy in fact lie in a complex set of local initiatives 
developed in the Punjab and North Western Provinces (NWP) in the early 1850s. A 
complete genealogy of the policy is beyond the scope of this article, though I have 
attempted as much in my book Penal Power and Colonial Rule (Brown, 2014). 
Nevertheless, four features of it are worthy of brief note. First, the criminal tribe 
concept itself emerged in the late 1840s and early 1850s but was, in its early 
incarnations at least, little distinguishable from accounts of tribal or hereditary 
conduct then circulating in Britain and elsewhereく HWﾐヴ┞ M;┞ｴW┘げゲ IｴヴﾗﾐｷIﾉW ﾗa 
British urban life London Labour and the London Poor, for example, includes 
deゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa けIﾗゲデWヴﾏﾗﾐｪWヴｷﾐｪ ぷ┘ｴｷIｴへ ゲWWﾏゲ ;ﾐ ｴWヴWSｷデ;ヴ┞ ヮ┌ヴゲ┌ｷデげ ふヱΒヵヱぎ ヴΑΓぶく 
What changed after mid-century was the sense that, in India, デヴｷHWゲげ IﾗﾐS┌Iデ ┘;ゲ 
determined not only by social forces, creating a distinct criminal habitus, but that 
two further, parallel, forces に of religion and caste に worked to make crime an 
occupation not only sanctioned but in a sense also required of the tribesman. Such 
aﾗヴIWゲ ┘WヴW ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデWS デﾗ ﾏW;ﾐ デｴ;デ aﾗヴ デｴW ｴWヴWSｷデ;ヴ┞ IﾐSｷ;ﾐ Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ けｷデ ｷゲ ｴｷゲ 
trade, his caste, I ﾏ;┞ ゲ;┞ ｴｷゲ ヴWﾉｷｪｷﾗﾐ デﾗ Iﾗﾏﾏｷデ IヴｷﾏWげく4 
 
A second point to note is that the problems such tribes were felt to pose to colonial 
government were marked not by their particular seriousness so much as by their 
intractability and three related challenges that this threw up. To begin, tribes tended 
to be highly mobile at a moment when sedentarization was at the centre of colonial 
policy. They also posed problems of identification, in the sense that not only were 
they mobile but they seemed to the colonial eye indistinguishable from the great 
mass of Indｷ;げゲ ﾉﾗ┘Wヴ ﾗヴSWヴゲが ﾏﾗゲデ ﾗa ┘ｴﾗﾏ ┘WヴW ﾐﾗデ Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ ;デ ;ﾉﾉく Fｷﾐ;ﾉﾉ┞が デｴW 
デヴｷHWゲげ Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ IﾗﾐS┌Iデ ┘;ゲ ｷﾐデWヴヮヴWデWS ;ゲ ; ヴWﾃWIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ;ｪヴｷI┌ﾉデ┌ヴ;ﾉ WﾐSW;┗ﾗ┌ヴが 
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which was felt to be the heart and engine of native society, and so an affront to the 
peaceful and ordered society British government sought to fashion on the 
subcontinent.  
 
A third observation is that despite the second half of the nineteenth century being 
ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デWS ┘ｷデｴ ; ヴWゲ┌ヴｪWﾐデ ;ﾐSが ｷﾐ デｴW ﾃ┌ヴｷゲデ JくFく “デWヮｴWﾐげゲ ┘ﾗヴSゲが ; 
けHWﾉﾉｷｪWヴWﾐデげ Bヴｷデish imperialism (Stephen, 1883), a great weight of opinion within 
Indian administration in 1870 held that measures of punitive control and restrictive 
surveillance were unsuited to the purpose and spirit of British rule. For the Bombay 
Government
5
 such meaゲ┌ヴWゲ ┘WヴW けﾗHﾃWIデｷﾗﾐ;HﾉWげ ;ゲ デﾗﾗ aﾗヴ デｴW CｴｷWa CﾗﾏﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐWヴ 
of the Central Provinces
6
 ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS けHW ┌ﾐﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞げ ｷﾐ ヮヴ;IデｷIW け;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ 
;ゲ ﾗHﾃWIデｷﾗﾐ;HﾉW ｷﾐ ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉWげく E┗Wﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW North Western Provinces (NWP), 7 one of 
the areas where criminal tribes were to be targeted, they were viewed as け┗W┝;デｷﾗ┌ゲ 
ゲ┌ヴ┗Wｷﾉﾉ;ﾐIWげ and デﾗ けゲ;┗ﾗ┌ヴ ﾏﾗヴW ﾗa デｴW ;ｪW ﾗa H;ヴH;ヴｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS ;ヴW ﾗヮヮﾗゲWS デﾗ ;ﾉﾉ 
ｷSW;ゲ ﾗa ｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐｷデ┞ ;ﾐS Iｷ┗ｷﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげく8 
 
Despite such misgivings the Criminal Tribes Act was passed in the Legislative Council 
and received the assent of the Governor General on 12
th
 October 1871. The Act in 
this first incarnation had six distinctive features. First and most generally, it rode 
above the normal penal law, prescribing restrictions and setting punishments for 
acts that in most cases did not constitute criminal offences. Second, it applied to 
whole tribes that a local government (initially, Punjab, NWP and Oude) would claim 
デﾗ HW け;SSｷIデWS デﾗ デｴW ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ;デｷI Iﾗﾏﾏｷゲゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾐﾗﾐ-H;ｷﾉ;HﾉW ﾗaaWﾐIWゲげ ふゲく ヲぶが 
providing aﾗヴ デｴWｷヴ ﾐﾗデｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ;ゲ ; けIヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ デヴｷHWげく TｴｷヴSが ;ﾐ┞ デヴｷHWが ｪ;ﾐｪ ﾗヴ Iﾉ;ゲゲ ゲﾗ 
notified could be subjected to surveillance measures such as roll calls, restricted 
movement, a passport system and a range of other disabilities. Infraction of these 
rules was subject to administrative punishments, including whipping. Settled tribes 
could be moved to a new locality and nomadic tribes settled down, with provision 
for reformatory settlements to be established for recalcitrant members of both. 
Fourth, there woulS HW ﾐﾗ ;IIWゲゲ デﾗ ﾉWｪ;ﾉ ヴW┗ｷW┘ ﾗa SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲが ｷﾐ デｴ;デ けW┗Wヴ┞ ゲ┌Iｴ 
notification shall be conclusive proof that the provisions of this Act are applicable to 
デｴW デヴｷHWが ｪ;ﾐｪ ﾗヴ Iﾉ;ゲゲ ゲヮWIｷaｷWS デｴWヴWｷﾐげ ふゲく ヶぶく Fｷaデｴが ┘ｴWヴW ; Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ ﾗaaWﾐIW ┘;ゲ 
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committed by a registered person sentences would be magnified, such that a second 
conviction for one of the scheduled offences would result in a mandatory 7 years 
imprisonment; a third offence in transportation for life. Finally, the Act sought to 
responsibilize village headmen and landowners in the surveillance program, making 
them accountable for monitoring comings and goings of registered persons and 
liable to punishment if they failed to do so. 
 
The final observation to be made on the criminal tribes policy at this point concerns 
its effectiveness and early administration. Initially local governments struggled to 
make the case to the Government of India that their troublesome tribes did in fact 
ﾏWWデ デｴW IヴｷデWヴｷ; aﾗヴ ﾐﾗデｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐく M┌Iｴ ;ﾐWISﾗデW ﾗa デヴｷHWゲげ Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;bounded, but 
firm evidence was in fact scarce. As the NWP Legal Department noted on one draft 
;ヮヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ ヱΒΑヲ ヮヴｷﾗヴ デﾗ ｷデげゲ HWｷﾐｪ ゲWﾐデ ﾗﾐ デﾗ C;ﾉI┌デデ;ぎ  
 
It would, I think, have been more satisfactory if some closer description of 
their recent doings had been given than that they are always heard of as 
professional thieves, that they openly boast of having been trained from 
ｷﾐa;ﾐI┞ ｷﾐ ヮｷﾉaWヴｷﾐｪが ;ﾐS デｴ;デ デｴW┞ ｴ;┗W け;ﾉﾏﾗゲデ SWﾐ┌SWS デｴW ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗ┌ヴｷﾐｪ 
┗ｷﾉﾉ;ｪWゲ ﾗa ゲｴWWヮ ;ﾐS ｪﾗ;デゲげ ;ﾐS デｴ;デ ﾗﾐ W┗Wヴ┞ ﾗヮヮﾗヴデ┌ﾐｷデ┞ デｴW┞ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ゲデW;ﾉ ぐ B┌デ 
for any thing more specific the reports go back to 1853 and to 1863 before the 




TｴW ゲW┗Wヴｷデ┞ ﾗa デｴW AIデげゲ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ Iombined with scant resourcing for its 
administration initially left it for the most part ineffective. Yet that ineffectiveness 
was sheeted home not to bad design or maladministration but, surprisingly, to 
leniency, such that in 1896 a new Bill was put forward to strengthen the Act. While 
recognizing the severity of existing provisions, デｴW ﾐW┘ Bｷﾉﾉ ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS デｴ;デ けデｴW 
;ﾉデﾗｪWデｴWヴ W┝IWヮデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ IｷヴI┌ﾏゲデ;ﾐIWゲ ﾗa デｴW I;ゲWげ ┘WヴW ﾗa ゲ┌Iｴ ; ケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ け;ゲ デﾗ ﾃ┌ゲデｷa┞ 
still more drastic measures in order to strengthen the hands of the Government in 
coercing and, if possible, reforming the members, and more especially the rising 
generation, of such tribes, composed as they in fact are of criminals of the worst 
デ┞ヮWが ┘ｴﾗゲW ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ﾗII┌ヮ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ IヴｷﾏWげく10 This amending legislation was passed, but 
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following a partial review of the policy by the Indian Police Commission of 1902 (IPC, 
1905) new legislation to provide all-India application of the Act and to allow its 
application to a wider range of criminal groups was put forward. The Criminal Tribes 
Act 1911 repealed all earlier legislation and gave effect to these expansive 
objectives. But again first in 1923 and then substantively in 1924 new legislation 
again widened the application of the Act, making provision, for example, for 
troublesome groups to be deported from the native states into British jurisdiction 
whereupon they could be notified as criminal tribes and then once again deported 
within India to provide labour for industries such as the tea plantations (see 
generally Kamat, 2010; Radhakrishna, 2001). It was in this form that the criminal 
tribes policy finally settled, became mainstreamed and developed into a behemoth 
of illiberal control, surveillance and punishment.  
 
Who were the criminal tribes? 
 
“デ;デWS ｷﾐ デｴｷゲ ┘;┞ デｴW ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ デヴｷHWゲげ ｷSWﾐデｷデ┞ ｷゲ ﾗa Iﾗ┌ヴゲW デ┘ﾗ aﾗﾉSぎ 
who were they as a class or group, a section of Indian society; and who were they as 
people? The task and hope of excavating individual lives and subjectivities from the 
colonial archive is probably a misplaced one. As Gayatri Spivak observed in her essay 
けTｴW ‘;ﾐｷ ﾗa “ｷrﾏ┌ヴげが デｴW Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ゲ┌HﾃWIデ に even one as important as the wife of a 
Raja - けWﾏWヴｪWゲ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ┘ｴWﾐ ゲｴW ｷゲ ﾐWWSWS ｷﾐ デｴW ゲヮ;IW ﾗa ｷﾏヮWヴｷ;ﾉ ぷﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪWへ 
ヮヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐげ ふヱΓΒヵぎ ヲΑヰぶく AﾐS W┗Wﾐ デｴWﾐが ﾏﾗゲデ ヴWﾏ;ｷﾐ ﾐ;ﾏWﾉWゲゲが ;ゲ SｷS “ヮｷ┗;ﾆげゲ ‘;ﾐｷく 
In the later period of British rule the existence of petitions, participation in organized 
labour and the like provide some keys デﾗ デヴｷHWゲ ヮWﾗヮﾉWげゲ ヮWヴIWヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ;ゲヮｷヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ 
(see Kamat, 2010). In terms of the founding moments of the policy, which is the 
concern here, insights are speculative and refracted through the official archive, but 
they are not completely absent and will be returned to in a moment. 
 
As a class we are on firmer ground. Those designated criminal tribes tended to 
belong either to marginal social orders on the fringes of sedentary Indian society for 
whom petty crime was a matter of subsistence に such as Sansis; or to peripatetic 
groups who crisscrossed India trading salt or other goods from bullock and donkey, 
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but whose lifestyle became increasingly precarious in a rapidly modernizing society に 
such as Koravas; or to hill and forest tribes, whose incursions upon lowlanders were 
less and less tolerated に such as Bhils;11 or to tribes whose number were scattered 
across wide areas of territory and might, in certain areas, have been settled 
agriculturalists, while in others they were thought to be criminal, roving and in the 
Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ;ヴｪﾗデが けヮヴWS;デﾗヴ┞げ に such as Minas. These, then, were the kinds of tribes 
targeted by the Act. But it is important also to note that the very same sorts of 
groups would later be targeted by the postcolonial state as it sought to govern the 
ﾐW┘ ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげゲ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ﾏ;ヴｪｷﾐゲく The transfer of power in 1947 thus did little to release 
デｴW ゲデ;デWげゲ ｪヴｷヮ ┌ヮﾗﾐ ｷデゲ ﾏ;ヴｪｷﾐ;ﾉ ﾗヴSWヴゲく 
 
Who then were these people as people? It ｷゲ aヴﾗﾏ Iﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ゲWヴ┗;ﾐデゲげ ｷﾐデWヴ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ 
with them that some picture of the tribesmen and their lives emerges.
12
 In the 1857 
uprising, groups who would later be deemed habitually criminal were recorded as 
giving good and faithful service in Rajputana where they saved many British lives and 
shored up defences against the so-called mutineers (Brown, 2014: ch 4). Generally 
speaking, military officers seemed to view tribesmen as martial in character and 
official recruitment manuals spoke highly of them as individuals and soldiers. The 
Bｴｷﾉゲが ﾏWﾐデｷﾗﾐWS ;Hﾗ┗Wが ┘WヴW SWゲIヴｷHWS ｷﾐ Bﾗﾐ;ヴﾃWWげゲ Handbook of the Fighting 
Races of India (1899: 142ぶ ;ゲ HWｷﾐｪ けぷIへｴｷWa ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ デｴW ;Hﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;ﾉ ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴﾉ┞ デヴｷHWゲげ. 
Their contact with British authority had bWｪ┌ﾐ ｷﾐ ヱΒヱΑ ┘ｴWﾐ ; け┘WﾉﾉどﾏW;ﾐデ but 
rather unwise attemptげ ┘;ゲ ﾏ;SW けto prematurely interfere with the rights the Bhils 
had enjoyed from time immemorial, to levy blackmail on all who wished to be safe 
aヴﾗﾏ デｴWｷヴ SWヮヴWS;デｷﾗﾐゲげ ふBonarjee, 1899: 144). In another recruiting manual, 
BｷﾐｪﾉW┞げゲ ふヱΒΓΑ: 42) Notes on the Warlike Races of India and its Frontiers, the Mina 
was SWゲIヴｷHWS ;ゲ け; ゲﾏ;ヴデが a;ｷデｴa┌ﾉが ;ﾐS ﾗHWSｷWﾐデ ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴげく13 Summing up the position 
of these tribes in the mid 1870s, Lieutenant Colonel W.H. Beynon, Agent to the 
Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐﾗヴ GWﾐWヴ;ﾉ ｷﾐ ‘;ﾃヮ┌デ;ﾐ;が ヴWヮﾗヴデWS デｴ;デ けぷデへｴW ┌ﾐヴ┌ﾉｷﾐWゲゲ ;ﾐS ヮヴWS;デﾗヴ┞ ｴ;Hｷデゲ 
of the Bheels and Meenas are closely connected with the injustice, if not the cruelty, 
which they have constantly experienced at the hands of the [Native] State officials 
;ﾐS デｴW ヴ┌ﾉｷﾐｪ I;ゲデWゲげく14 Where they did secure a measure of protection from feudal 
landlords it often came ;デ ; Iﾗゲデぎ ;ゲ ﾗﾐW ;ﾐﾐ┌;ﾉ ヴWヮﾗヴデ ﾐﾗデWSが けデｴW ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ﾉ;ﾐSｴﾗﾉSWヴゲが 
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who should control them, still keep them in pay, and share their Hﾗﾗデ┞げ.15 They 
would find, however, that in coming to the attention of British authority the 
difficulties of life were not necessarily ameliorated and the changes of habitus 
expected of them often were not to their liking. As one frustrated administrator was 
to remark, けぷデへｴW┞ ｴ;┗W ;ﾐ ;ﾉﾏﾗゲデ ｷﾐ┗ｷﾐIｷHﾉW ヴWヮ┌ｪﾐ;ﾐIW デﾗ ;ｪヴｷI┌ﾉデ┌ヴWげく16 Indeed, the 
failure of many tribes placed in reformatory villages to grow enough food for their 
own sustenance meant they were often only けkept from starving by direct grants 
froﾏ Gﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげ.17 Such were the difficult circumstances under which the criminal 
tribes policy was born. 
 
The Criminal Tribes Act in the shadow of independence  
 
The criminal tribes policy had been given effect through central Government of India 
legislation, the final version being the Criminal Tribes Act 1924. Yet in a curious 
double movement, the Act gave local governments concurrent jurisdiction to 
determine whether or not it should apply in their territories and, if necessary, how it 
might be amended to reflect local needs and conditions. By the late 1930s there was 
growing sentiment that the Act was outmoded and inconsistent with the liberal 
freedoms that Indians, albeit still colonial subjects, should enjoy. A Criminal Tribes 
Act Enquiry Committee appointed by the Bombay Government in 1937 
recommended significant dilution of the punitive elements of the legislation and in 
1942 the government there amended the Act accordingly. In Madras and Uttar 
Pradesh also reviews were undertaken around this time with a view to determining 
デｴW ;ヮヮヴﾗヮヴｷ;デWﾐWゲゲ ﾗa デｴW AIデげゲ ヴWゲデヴｷIデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ヮ┌ﾐｷゲｴﾏWﾐデゲ デﾗ デｴW ﾏﾗSWヴﾐ S;┞く 
Madras amended the Act as it applied in its territory twice, once in 1943 and again in 
1945. By 1946 a second Uttar Pradesh enquiry committee was referring to criminal 
デヴｷHWゲ ;ゲ けｴ;Hｷデ┌;ﾉ ﾗaaWﾐSWヴゲ ;ﾐS ┗;ｪヴ;ﾐデゲげ ;ﾐS ヴWIﾗﾏﾏWﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾐW┘ ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ 
framed in these terms rather than the now anachronistic idea of Indians labelled 
criminal by birth.  
 
At the level of central government, private members bills seeking repeal of the 
Criminal Tribes Act were introduced in 1946, 1947 and 1949. The first of these was 
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never properly pursued and fell by the wayside. In 1947 a repeal Bill was introduced 
on 6 February by Sri R. Venkatasubba Reddiar に barely six months before 
independence に but the demand for repeal was withdrawn when he was informed 
that provinces themselves were beginning to take decisive action and that, indeed, 
けデｴW M;Sヴ;ゲ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ﾐﾗ┘ ｴ;ゲ HWaﾗヴW ｷデげゲ LWｪｷゲﾉ;デ┌ヴW ; Bｷﾉﾉ デﾗ ヮヴﾗIWWS ┘ｷデｴ デｴW 
ヴWヮW;ﾉ ﾗa デｴW AIデ ;ゲ a;ヴ ;ゲ デｴ;デ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷﾐIW ｷゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWSげく18 Similarly, in 1949 the 
demand for repeal was withdrawn based upon a promise made by the Minister for 
Home Affairs that a central government enquiry committee would be appointed to 
review the Act at an all-India level. The Minister made good upon his word and on 28 
September 1949 a Criminal Tribes Act Enquiry Committee was appointed with a 
remit to consider the legislation in all its aspects and make suitable 
recommendations for repeal or reform. 
 
けTｴｷゲ aヴWW ﾉ;ﾐS ﾗa ﾗ┌ヴゲげぎ TｴW Cヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ TヴｷHWゲ AIデ Eﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW SWﾉｷHWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ 
 
Following its first meeting in December 1949 the Criminal Tribes Act Enquiry 
Committee developed a questionnaire which it sent to 300 relevant members of 
local governments and interested parties. In the course of its enquiries it interviewed 
more than 200 witnesses, toured the Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, 
Orissa, Bombay and Madras. Its members travelled more than 10,000 miles by train 
and an estimated 1,200 miles by road, visiting along the way five settlements in 
which criminal tribes were interned and 14 colonies or villages of a reformatory 
character where they had been placed. 
 
 けWherever ┘W ┘Wﾐデげが デｴW CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW ヴWヮﾗヴデWSが け┘W ｴW;ヴS ﾗﾐW ゲｷﾐｪﾉW Iヴ┞ aヴﾗﾏ ;ﾉﾉ デｴW 
criminal tribes that whereas India obtained freedom, they continued to be in 
HﾗﾐS;ｪW ;ﾐS デｴWｷヴ SWﾏ;ﾐS aﾗヴ ゲWデデｷﾐｪ デｴWﾏ aヴWW H┞ ヴWヮW;ﾉｷﾐｪ デｴW AIデ ┘;ゲ ｷﾐゲｷゲデWﾐデげ 
(Criminal Tribes Act Enquiry Committee, 1951: 81; hereafter, Enquiry Committee). 
MﾗヴW ヮヴﾗゲ;ｷI;ﾉﾉ┞が デｴW CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW SWデWヴﾏｷﾐWS デｴ;デ デｴW AIデげゲ Iﾉ;ゲゲｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
individuals as members of a criminal tribe by dint of birth was almost certainly 
┌ﾐIﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉが ﾗHゲWヴ┗ｷﾐｪ けデｴ;t no one in this free land of ours should be treated as 
; Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ ﾏWヴWﾉ┞ HWI;┌ゲW ﾗa デｴW ｷﾐIｷSWﾐデ ﾗa Hｷヴデｴげ ふEnquiry Committee, 1951: 91). 
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Offensive to the Constitution also was the compulsory work required of registered 
tribesmen in reformatory settlements, which not only constituted an offence under 
the Indian Penal Code, but was also opposed to Article 23 of the Constitution and 
ヮﾉ;IWS IﾐSｷ; ｷﾐ HヴW;Iｴ ﾗa デｴW IﾐデWヴﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ L;Hﾗ┌ヴ Oヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐげゲ (ILO) Convention on 
Forced or Compulsory Labour. Indeed, the Ministry of Labour gave evidence that it 
was due only to this Act that India was unable to become a signatory to the ILO 
Convention. At the provincial level, the Act had been repealed in Madras in 1947 and 
Bombay in 1949. In Uttar Pradesh the local government was moving toward repeal 
of the Act based upon pre-independence recommendations. And in the former 
native states of Rajputana new legislation to repeal and replace the Criminal Tribes 
Act had been passed in February 1950. The case for doing away with the criminal 
tribes policy could not seem to be stronger. 
 
けH;Hｷデ┌;ﾉ ﾗaaWﾐSWヴゲ ;ﾐS ┗;ｪヴ;ﾐデゲげぎ Tﾗ┘;ヴS ; ﾐW┘ ｪヴ;ﾏﾏ;ヴ ﾗa Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉ 
 
Upon the abhorrence of a system whereby children born into certain social groups 
came automatically to be classified as members of a criminal tribe there was no 
doubt or debate. Past this point, however, the Enquiry Committee soon discovered 
strong demands for continuity of practice with the former colonial approach. The 
taint of criminality by birth must be done away with, but the idea that the conduct of 
ゲﾗﾏW ﾗa デｴWゲW ｪヴﾗ┌ヮゲげ ﾏWﾏHWヴゲ に both in terms of their criminality and their 
nomadic, wandering, instincts に required a firm and distinctive architecture of 
suppression, and where possible reform, was widely held. Where ever the Criminal 
Tribes Act had been repealed it had been replaced by habitual offender statutes,
19
 
but as the Enquiry Committee observed, in many respects these new statutes merely 
replicated the Act minus one or two of its more offensive clauses.  
 
When local governments and their key officials were asked to comment upon the 
desirability of retaining the Act or repealing it, repeal was in the main desired. But 
respondents almost unanimously made the caveat that suitable habitual offender 
legislation to achieve the same effect, but without the vices noted above, should be 
developed and should be enacted so as to overlap in temporal terms with the repeal 
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process. What is most striking in these responses is the deep continuity of thinking 
among those engaged in criminal tribes management and in government more 
generally with rationalities and practices running right back to the turn of the 
century. Surveillance and suppression concerns raised by the Indian Police 
Commission of 1902 returned to the page in the responses of local governments in 
the immediate post-independence period. Themes that are today mainly associated 
with the despotisms of European colonial powers, particularly around the 
identification, pacification and sedentarization of native subjects, were strongly 
presented by postcolonial state officials not just as desirable but indeed as 
indispensible. The Deputy Commissioner for Criminal Tribes in the Punjab, for 
example, reprised in his submission the idea of roundups and enclosures that had 
been a feature of criminal tribes administration in the years before 1920, arguing 
デｴ;デ けぷｪへenerally speaking persons who wander about start as beggars and end as 
ｴ;ヴSWﾐWS Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉゲげが ゲﾗ デｴ;デ けぷ;へll over the country simultaneous raids must be 
carヴｷWS ﾗ┌デ デﾗ I;デIｴ デｴW ┗;ｪヴ;ﾐデゲ ;ﾐS デｴWﾐ ゲWデデﾉW デｴWﾏ ﾗﾐ ┌ゲWa┌ﾉ ﾗII┌ヮ;デｷﾗﾐゲげ 
(Enquiry Committee, 1951: 88). Many echoes were also heard of the suppositions 
;Hﾗ┌デ デヴｷHWゲげ HWｴ;┗ｷﾗ┌ヴ デｴ;デ ｴ;S ﾉW;S デﾗ デｴW AIデげゲ ｷﾐｷデｷ;ﾉ ヮ;ゲゲ;ｪW in 1871. And now 
just as before, they were generally unsupported by any data. The Criminal Tribes 
Officer in Gwailor gave the tone of these when he proposed of the Kanjar tribe that 
けぷﾗへur suspicion is that [they] commit crimes and remain undetected and hence the 
whole tribe of Kanjars must HW IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴWS ;ゲ ｴ;Hｷデ┌;ﾉ ﾗaaWﾐSWヴゲげ ふEnquiry 
Committee, 1951: ΒΑぶく Iﾐ ﾗデｴWヴ I;ゲWゲ デｴW AIデげゲ ヴWデWﾐデｷﾗﾐ ┘;ゲ aWﾉデ ;ヮヮヴﾗヮヴｷ;デW ｪｷ┗Wﾐ 
the myriad other claims upon government time and attention in the post-
independence period. The Government of Orissa, for exaﾏヮﾉWが ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS デｴ;デ けデｴW 
Act should remain in force for the present and the matter should be reviewed after 
ヱヰ ┞W;ヴゲげ ふEnquiry Committee, 1951: 84), while the government of the new state of 
Madhya Bharat informWS デｴW Eﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW デｴ;デ けぷヮへremature abolition of the 
old system of control may lead to results with which our weak administration may 
aｷﾐS ｷデ SｷaaｷI┌ﾉデ デﾗ IﾗヮWげ ふEnquiry Committee, 1951: 87). 
 
For its part the Enquiry Committee drew two primary conclusions from responses to 
their 300 solicited questionnaires and something like 200 interviews undertaken 
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with stakeholders. First, it recognised widespread consent on the need to shift 
offender classification from a communal to an individual basis and to replace the 
idea of criminal tribes with that of habitual offenders: 
 
After careful consideration, we have unanimously reached the conclusion that 
the time has arrived, if it is not already overdue, for the replacement of the 
existing Act by a Central legislation applicable to all habitual offenders without 
any distinction based on caste, creed or birth. (Enquiry Committee, 1951: 90) 
 
At the same time, however, the Enquiry Committee noted many reservations with 
the habitual offender statutes already enacted in provinces like Madras and Bombay. 
Rather remarkably, the Committee tended to view the new legislation as having 
swung too far in the direction of freedom and indeed favoured a move back toward 
the more deeply intrusive control apparatus of the colonial era. 
 
けNﾗデ ﾉWｪ;ﾉﾉ┞ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW ﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞ Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘げぎ TｴW ﾐWWS aﾗヴ W┝デヴ;ﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞ 
measures 
 
It had been a central argument of J.F. Stephen, the law member who shepherded 
デｴW Cヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ TヴｷHWゲ ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW Gﾗ┗Wヴﾐﾗヴ GWﾐWヴ;ﾉげゲ LWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷ┗W Cﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾉ ｷﾐ 
1870-71, that ordinary criminal law was too weak to deal with the threat posed by 
criminal tribes. Introducing the Bill on 3 October 1870 he proposed that part of the 
ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏ ﾉ;┞ ｷﾐ デｴW a;Iデ けデｴ;デ Eﾐｪﾉｷゲｴ ﾉ;┘┞Wヴゲ ;ﾐS ﾉ;┘-courts had a most exaggerated 
estimate of the power of the ordinary crimiﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ デﾗ IﾗヮW ┘ｷデｴ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣WS IヴｷﾏWげく 
IﾐSWWSが ｴW ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデWSが けTﾗ ゲ┌ヮヮﾗゲW デｴ;デ ﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞ ヮヴﾗIWゲゲWゲ ﾗa ﾉ;┘ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS W┗Wヴ ヮ┌デ 
Sﾗ┘ﾐ IヴｷﾏW ┘;ゲ ﾉｷﾆW ゲ┌ヮヮﾗゲｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ ゲヮﾗヴデゲﾏWﾐ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS W┝デWヴﾏｷﾐ;デW ｪ;ﾏWげく20 Now, as 
representatives of the postcolonial state came to look at the problem, they tended 
to agree. The key to heading off the threat posed by members of these marginal 
social groups, the Enquiry Committee (1951: 91) observed, was an extensive system 
of surveillance whether or not those so targeted had committed any offWﾐIWゲぎ けH┌デげが 
デｴW┞ ﾗHゲWヴ┗WSが けデｴｷゲ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ ﾉWｪ;ﾉﾉ┞ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW ﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞ Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘げ.  
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Furthermore, despite the mooted shift from a communal model of classification, 
grounded in concepts of tribe, class or gang, to an individual model based upon the 
idea of habituality, there was the problem that India remained, in practice, a society 
very much ordered by those very communal groupings an individualising Habitual 
Offenders Act would seek to extinguish. Where groups were nomadic, peripatetic, 
bodies or where the habitual offenders were serious offenders there would be a 
need to restrict their movement, to corral them and confine them in the old colonial 
a;ゲｴｷﾗﾐく B┌デ ;ｪ;ｷﾐ ｷデ ┘;ゲ ﾗHゲWヴ┗WS デｴ;デ デｴWヴW ┘WヴW け;ﾉゲﾗ ﾐﾗ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW 
existing criminal law for establishment of settlements, where attempts can be made 
at reformation of these offenders and also for the proper treatment of their 
IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげ ふEnquiry Committee, 1951: 91). Gradually, step-by-step, the Enquiry 
Committee began rebuilding the machinery of colonial control.  
 
In discussing the children of the criminal tribes the Enquiry Committee had earlier 
registered its wholesale support for the conclusions of the Indian Jails Committee of 
1919-20, a body that had looked askance at the criminal tribes policy and made 
strong recommendations, unheeded, for its incorporation into the normal machinery 
of justice and its governance under ordinary principles of individual rights and social 
Wケ┌ｷデ┞く TｴW J;ｷﾉゲ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW ｴ;S SWゲIヴｷHWS デｴW AIデげゲ ヴWﾏﾗ┗;ﾉ ﾗa IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐ aヴﾗﾏ 
ヮ;ヴWﾐデゲ ;デ aﾗ┌ヴ ┞W;ヴゲ ﾗa ;ｪW ;ゲ け;ﾐ ;Iデ ﾗa ｷﾐｴ┌ﾏ;ﾐｷデ┞ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷデ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ｴ;ヴS デﾗ ﾃ┌ゲデｷa┞ 
except on grounds of unavoidabﾉW ﾐWIWゲゲｷデ┞げ ;ﾐSが ヮヴWゲIｷWﾐデﾉ┞が ┘;ヴﾐWS ﾗa デｴW 
ゲWデデﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ ゲ┞ゲデWﾏ デｴ;デ けｷデ ｷゲ ┗Wヴ┞ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ デｴ;デ デｴW┞ ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗデ HW ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘WS デﾗ 
degenerate into a novel type of jail where members of the criminal tribes can be 
locked up indefinitely without the usual formaliデｷWゲ ﾗa ; デヴｷ;ﾉげ (Indian Jails Committee, 
1920: 327, ンンヱぶく B┌デ ﾐﾗ┘ デｴW Eﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWW SｷゲIWヴﾐWS ﾃ┌ゲデ デｴﾗゲW ┗Wヴ┞ けｪヴﾗ┌ﾐSゲ 
ﾗa ┌ﾐ;┗ﾗｷS;HﾉW ﾐWIWゲゲｷデ┞げ デﾗ HW ;デ ｴ;ﾐSぎ けWW a┌ヴデｴWヴ ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデ デｴ;デ ｷﾐ デｴW ヮヴﾗヮﾗゲWS 
Act the State Governments be empowered to order the segregation of the children 
ﾗa ｴ;Hｷデ┌;ﾉ ﾗaaWﾐSWヴゲ aヴﾗﾏ デｴWｷヴ ヮ;ヴWﾐデゲげ ふEnquiry Committee, 1951: 99). A list of 
けcircumstancesげ, essentially describing the precarious conditions of life experienced 
by many criminal tribes on the margins of Indian society, provided the justificatory 
criteria for IｴｷﾉSヴWﾐげゲ removal. 
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Thus it was that in the immediate postcolonial moment and at the very point where 
NWｴヴ┌げゲ (1947) ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾏﾗ┗ｷﾐｪ けaヴﾗﾏ デｴW ﾗﾉS デﾗ デｴW ﾐW┘が ┘ｴWﾐ ;ﾐ ;ｪW WﾐSゲ ぐ ぷ;ﾐSへ 
デｴW ヮ;ゲデ ｷゲ ﾗ┗Wヴげが デｴW Cヴｷﾏｷﾐal Tribes Act Enquiry Committee first deconstructed and 
then piece by piece reconstructed an unambiguously illiberal vision of penal control 
for subordinate social classes. The window dressing changes of nomenclature, from 
criminal tribes to habitual offenders, does little to change the fact that for some 
Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW ﾐW┘ IﾐSｷ; けaヴWWSﾗﾏげ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS Wﾐデ;ｷﾉ ｷﾐｴ;Hｷデｷﾐｪ a much truncated version 
of universal liberal rights-bearing citizenship. How can we make sense of this? 
 
Liberty and the seductions of repression: Penality and postcolonial citizenship 
 
Penal theory offers few guides to how mechanisms of control in postcolonial states 
might be understood. Some time ago I looked at the other side of the coin, 
suggesting that developments in contemporary western penality linking certain 
groups, and particularly sex offenders, within a subordinate form of citizenship might 
be understood as reprising a distinctly colonial logic (Brown, 2005a, 2005b; see also 
Hamilton, 2011; Moore, 2014). Viewed now, we might say the presumption that 
repression was the preserve of colonial regimes was premature. The case of these 
tribes deemed criminal within the arc of colonial penal power, yet quickly re-
encompassed and reframed as habitual offenders with the postcolonial 
dispensation, points to a need for a more complex theoretical palette than penal 
theory currently has to offer. 
 
One useful approach may lie within that trajectory of postcolonial theory I sketched 
in section one. It will be recalled that this body of work problematizes the 
presumption that independence movements founded upon claims to liberty, 
independence and freedom from the colonial yoke would, or perhaps could, deliver 
upon those ideals, instantiating them in the character and form of the postcolonial 
state. My inclination to draw upon the けW┗Wヴ┞S;┞ ゲデ;デWげ ﾉｷデWヴ;デ┌ヴW lay in its focus 
upon citizen-state relations as subject to constant contest and negotiation. From this 
view, postcolonial citizenship emerges as a negotiated settlement between the state 
and a variety of Iﾉ;ゲゲWゲ ﾗa ┘ｴ;デ ﾏｷｪｴデ HW デWヴﾏWS けヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲげぎ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉゲ ;ﾐS 
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groups within the territorial confines of new states at the moment of their birth 
(Sherman, 2014) who must in some manner be incorporated into the new nation.  
 
One obvious site where such negotiation might have taken place was the extensive 
meetings, visits, deliberations and research of tｴW ﾐW┘ IﾐSｷ;げゲ Cヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ TヴｷHWゲ AIデ 
Enquiry Committee. Understanding the fundamentally illiberal attitude of the 
Enquiry Committee toward one such class of Indian citizens is important here, since 
these were the first jousts in what would turn out to be a long and difficult 
negotiation between members of these tribes and the state of India over their status 
within the Republic.
21
 To achieve such understanding certainly requires recognition 
ﾗa デｴW けヮヴW-W┝ｷゲデｷﾐｪ SWH;デWゲ ;ﾐS ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWゲげ デﾗ ┘ｴｷIｴ NW┘Hｷｪｷﾐ (2014: 37) 
refers. But more than that, it also demands a critical appreciation of the material 
realities of work in the postcolony. And so too of the degree to which postcolonial 
actors often were no better prepared, and sometimes worse so, than their colonial 
predecessors for the task of giving effect to transcendent constitutional ideals of 
equality and freedom.  
 
There is not space here to consider these problems in detail and the preceding 
;ﾐ;ﾉ┞ゲｷゲ ﾗa デｴW Eﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWげゲ Report will leave no doubt as to the restricted 
┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デヴｷHWゲげ Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲｴｷヮ status Committee members seem to have held. 
Nevertheless, four issues may be noted as bearing in material ways upon the field of 
potential outcomes available to the negotiation process: the framing of enquiry 
IﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWゲげ デWヴﾏゲ ﾗa ヴWaWヴWﾐIWき デｴW HﾗS┞ ﾗa ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪW ┌ﾐSWヴヮｷﾐﾐｷﾐｪ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ 
making; the perceived limits of repression within a liberal order; and the presence, 
recognition and representation of subaltern voices.  
 
Administrative continuities and precedents. The first two of these issues reinforce 
デｴW けW┗Wヴ┞S;┞ ゲデ;デWげ ﾉｷデWヴ;デ┌ヴWげゲ ﾗHゲWヴ┗;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ゲ┌Hゲデ;ﾐデｷ;ﾉ ;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W 
continuities over the colonial/postcolonial divide. Enquiry committees had been 
established in Bombay, Madras and Uttar Pradesh beginning in the mid 1930s, 
resulting in major changes to the Act even prior デﾗ IﾐSｷ;げゲ ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIW ｷﾐ A┌ｪ┌ゲデ 
1947. Looking at the terms of reference for these enquiries reveals there was 
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nothing distinctively postcolonial about the terms set by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs in September 1949. Nor indeed was there anything distinctively postcolonial 
in the responses of local government officers, most of whom as Indians were filling 
the same positions as had existed under the British government of India. Many of 
these officers had spent a lifetime within the cultural habitus of colonial police and 
social welfare bureaucracies and some would have contributed to the administration 
reports upon which the Enquiry Committee relied. Further still, these civil servants 
would have been aware that there was precedent, albeit limited, for the extension 
of criminal tribes mechanisms to individuals, both in the Punjab (see below) and 
Burma.
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 With respect to the character of the tribes under judgement に who they 
were as people, as new citizens に the knowledge upon which the 1949-50 Enquiry 
Committee relied was almost entirely colonial in its derivation. Almost 140 pages of 
its Report ┘WヴW ｪｷ┗Wﾐ ﾗ┗Wヴ デﾗ SWゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa デヴｷHWゲげ ｴ;Hｷデゲが ﾏ;ﾐﾐWヴゲ ;ﾐS ﾗaaWﾐSｷﾐｪ 
proclivities culled largely from colonial policing and administration manuals, some of 
which dated well back into the nineteenth century. To the now-contemporary 
observer this might seem manifestly and massively inadequate, but in the immediate 
ゲｴ;Sﾗ┘ ﾗa ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIWが ┘ｴ;デ ﾗデｴWヴ ﾆｷﾐS ﾗa ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪW ﾗa ゲﾗ ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ﾗa IﾐSｷ;げゲ 
inferior and marginal social orders could have been drawn upon?  
 
The limits of repression within a liberal constitutional order. More substantively 
important, however, is the governmental attitude to illiberal legislation. Remarkably, 
デｴW Eﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWげゲ Report evinced far greater tolerance for derogation from 
the kinds of citizenship rights promised free subjects under the Indian Constitution 
than colonial administrators were, for their part, prepared to countenance for their 
subjects. Indeed, what marked the criminal tribes policy out during the colonial era 
was not just its scope or its repressive character. Most important perhaps, though 
this has been little noticed in the literature, was its status as a piece of extraordinary 
legislation. In amending the Act in 1923, for example, the Government of India had 
W┝ヮヴWゲゲﾉ┞ ヴWﾃWIデWS デｴW IﾐSｷ;ﾐ J;ｷﾉゲ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWげゲ ふヱΓヲヰぶ ヴWcommendation that it 
should be brought within the normal laws and rules of India. Indeed, the Secretary of 
State for India in London had been at pains to clearly and unambiguously describe its 
special status. Referring to the 1918 Punjab Habitual Offenders Bill that replicated 
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the criminal tribes machinery, he proposed that the restriction of movement and 
extension of police surveillance to individuals not yet convicted of any offence 
けaccepts a principle which has not, I think, found a place in the permanent, as 
ﾗヮヮﾗゲWS デﾗ WﾏWヴｪWﾐI┞が ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Bヴｷデｷゲｴ IﾐSｷ;げく ‘WaWヴヴｷﾐｪ デﾗ BWﾐｪ;ﾉ ‘Wｪ┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐ III 
of 1818, which provided for the preventive detention of political suspects without 
trial, as well as similar regulations in Madras and Bombay, he put them all together 
as measures of an exceptional character: examples ﾗa けW┝IWヮデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ﾉWｪｷゲﾉ;デｷﾗﾐげ the 
passage of which けゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗデ ｷﾐ ｷデゲWﾉa HW デ;ﾆWﾐ ;ゲ ; ヮヴWIWSWﾐデ aﾗヴ ゲｷﾏｷﾉ;ヴ Wﾐ;IデﾏWﾐデゲ 
ｷﾐ ﾗデｴWヴ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷﾐIWゲげく23  
 
Wｴ;デ ｷゲ ヴWﾏ;ヴﾆ;HﾉW ｷﾐ デｴW Eﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWげゲ deliberations is the lack of any 
equivalent reference back to overarching ideals, either to the new Cﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐげゲ 
meaning and vision or more generally to the liberal political ideals of freedom and 
civic participation. Alternatively, there might have been some effort to seek 
justification in necessity or discourses of security, as the work of Kalhan (2010; 
Kalhan et al., 2006) might lead us to expect. The demands of social order were 
implicit yet un-reflected upon. That the Enquiry Committee seemed to imagine a 
form of secondary citizenship as so natural as not to require comment does, 
however, chime ┘ｷデｴ NW┘Hｷｪｷﾐげゲ ふヲヰヱヴ) observations on Hindu agitation in respect 
of personal laws. けOﾐ IﾉﾗゲWヴ ｷﾐゲヮWIデｷﾗﾐげ, she concludes, ｷデ ｷゲ IﾉW;ヴ デｴ;デ けHｷﾐS┌ 
reformers were not calling for freedom and riｪｴデゲ aﾗヴ W┗Wヴ┞ﾗﾐWげ (Newbigin, 2014: 
12). If modern rights and freedoms constituted forms of power, then in a hierarchical 
society why indeed should they not be distributed hierarchically also? 
 
Can the subaltern speak? Among the most withering criticisms of colonial rule in 
India has been that which emerged from the subaltern studies collective (see 
Chaturvedi, 2000; Ludden, 2002) and in particular questions relating to Indiansげ 
voices represented most famously in Gayatri “ヮｷ┗;ﾆげゲ ふヱΓΒΒぶ ヴｴWデﾗヴｷI;ﾉ ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐ and 
essay けC;ﾐ デｴW ゲ┌H;ﾉデWヴﾐ ゲヮW;ﾆいげく “ヮｷ┗;ﾆげゲ ヮﾗｷﾐデ デｴWヴW ;ﾐS ｷﾐ デｴW Wゲゲ;┞ けTｴW Rani of 
“ｷヴﾏ┌ヴげ ふヱΓΒヵぶ, discussed earlier, concerned the limited role IﾐSｷ;ﾐ ┘ﾗﾏWﾐげゲ voices 
(subordinated to colonial and patriarchal authority) held in shaping debate and 
resolving けデｴW ヮヴﾗHﾉWﾏげ their conduct posed. For subalternists and many other 
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postcolonialists, the failure to make space for けﾐ;デｷ┗Wげ ┗ﾗｷIWゲ ｷﾐ デｴW ヴWIﾗヴSゲ ﾗa WﾏヮｷヴW 
is a kind of stake to be driven through the colonial heart, illustrating once and for all 
its malign character. 
 
Yet from the evidence at hand here, the Enquiry Committee achieved little better. It 
visited a handful of criminal tribes settlements and villages on its long tour of India 
during 1949-50. It is apparent from the appendices to its Report that members of 
criminal tribes were interviewed. But only five of the 127 tribes identified by the 
Committee were entertained to speak. And even then it is uncertain what kind of 
input they might have had. In many cases, like “ヮｷ┗;ﾆげゲ ‘;ﾐｷ, not even their names 
were considered worth notingぎ けDWヮ┌デ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヴ B;┌ヴｷ;ゲげが ﾗヴ けDWヮ┌デ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヲヰ “;ﾐゲｷゲ 
;デ Dｷﾐ; N;ｪ;ヴ ‘;ｷﾉ┘;┞ Cヴﾗゲゲｷﾐｪげ ふEﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWが ヱΓヵヱぎ ヱヲヶぶく What therefore 
stands out in the Report and what connects that document with much of the earlier 
colonial administrative literature reviewing the criminal tribes policy (eg., Kaul and 
Tomkins, 1914) is precisely this absence of voices of criminal tribes men and women 
themselves. It is as if the Enquiry Committee were unable to reconfigure the colonial 
cognitive horizon within which, for reasons both material and constitutive, they 
were caught. Bヴﾗ┌ｪｴデ デﾗｪWデｴWヴ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ﾉｷデWヴ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa デｴW けW┗Wヴ┞S;┞ ゲデ;デWげが 
emphasizing as it does the complex, contested and contingent nature of citizenship 
in the postcolonial state, this raises important questions about how the voices of 
subaltern groups in India and elsewhere might be rendered audible. The Enquiry 
Committee noted the complaiﾐデゲ ﾗa デヴｷHWゲ けデｴ;デ ┘ｴWヴW;ゲ IﾐSｷ; ﾗHデ;ｷﾐWS aヴWWSﾗﾏが 
デｴW┞ Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌WS デﾗ HW ｷﾐ HﾗﾐS;ｪWげ ふEﾐケ┌ｷヴ┞ Cﾗﾏﾏｷttee, 1951: 81), but beyond this 
single instance within the Report there is no contribution of tribes people to the 
discourse of postcolonial restriction and surveillance.  
 
Of course this is not to say that subaltern voices were nowhere to be heard at all. 
Indeed, debate on the criminal tribes and habitual offender provisions can be found 
ｷﾐ デｴW デｴWﾐ IﾗﾐデWﾏヮﾗヴ;ヴ┞ ヮヴWゲゲ ;ﾐS デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴﾗ┌デ デｴW ヮWヴｷﾗS ﾗa デｴW AIデげゲ ﾗヮWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ 
aggrieved tribes people petitioned government on a variety of matters. But as the 
concern in this article has been with discourses of penal governance we are forced to 
conclude that subaltern voices appear to have penetrated little into these networks 
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ﾗa ヮﾗ┘Wヴく Tｴ┌ゲが ｷﾐ Iﾗﾐデヴ;ゲデ デﾗ NW┘Hｷｪｷﾐげゲ ｴｷｪｴWヴ I;ゲデW HｷﾐS┌ ﾏ;ﾉWゲ who successfully 
renegotiated the writ of personal laws, the criminal tribes men and women were 
negligible and that form of reduction is apparent not only in the Report but so too in 




This article has contributed to what Sherman, Gould and Ansari (2014: 3) bemoan as 
the too けﾉｷデデﾉW SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐげ ｷﾐ IﾗﾐデWﾏヮﾗヴ;ヴ┞ ゲIｴﾗﾉ;ヴゲｴｷヮ of けthe everyday aspects of the 
early post-1947 state [in India] or linked notions of citizenship-in-the-ﾏ;ﾆｷﾐｪげく Iデ ｴ;ゲ 
also contributed further evidence of what they term デｴW けヮﾗ┘Wヴa┌ﾉ Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌ｷデｷWゲ 
between the pre- and post-ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIW ヮWヴｷﾗSゲげ in terms of state function and 
lives lived in India. The article has shown how major reviews of a most odious 
example of colonial era penal legislation, the Criminal Tribes Act 1924, were 
undertaken across the colonial/postcolonial divide, spanning the years 1937-1952 
and the emergence of India as an independent nation state in August 1947. In the 
final, post independence, review that has sat at the centre of this article the colonial 
armature of control was first deconstructed on grounds of principle and offence, 
before being slowly rebuilt to satisfy the demands of local governments for 
continuity of rule and repressive control over those new citizens who sat on the 
margins of Indian society. Time and again it was noted that the ordinary criminal law 
could not be relied upon to address the special problems that criminal tribes に now 
relabelled habituals and vagrants に would pose to the new nation state.  
 
This armature of control has been described here primarily in terms of continuity, 
but it is worth observing that at a number of points に from decisions about the 
removal of children from parents, to the incorporation of habitual offender 
measures into the ordinary machinery of law に the postcolonial state went farther 
than its colonial predecessor had been willing to go. The postcolonial reformulation 
of colonial modes was thus in many ways more repressive than what came before it. 
Similarly, with respect to the idea of a colonial/postcolonial divide, there is evidence 
that the continuities observed here were established much earlier デｴ;ﾐ デｴW けヴ┌ヮデ┌ヴWげ 
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point of 1947. From at least the 1920s and certainly by the 1930s the wind-down of 
the British colonial state had transferred significant political power into Indian hands 
at both local and regional levels. This is well illustrated in M;ﾐﾃｷヴｷ K;ﾏ;デげゲ ふヲヰヱヰぶ 
ゲデ┌S┞ ﾗa Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ デヴｷHWゲげ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾉ┗WﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ ﾉ;Hﾗ┌ヴ Sｷゲヮ┌デWゲ in the tea industry during the 
1930sく HWヴ ゲデ┌S┞ ﾗa Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ デヴｷHWゲげ experiences under the newly installed Congress 
administration there illustrates just how much that government moved within the 
same cognitive and strategic horizons as earlier British administrations. 
 
In making visible these continuities in their various forms the article has therefore 
attempted to problematize any easy binary separation of colonial and postcolonial 
states and the governance thereof. In doing so, however, it has also raised a series of 
questions about the scope and concerns of postcolonial penality as a distinctive field 
of study. After all, what is it about the postcolonial state that is distinctive if not the 
けヮﾗゲデげ ﾗa coloniality itself? In seeking to answer that in relation to the criminal tribes 
case study I have tried to tie a series of criminological questions into the wider 
theoretical horizon of postcolonial studies. Two ideas in particular に the notions of 
postcolonial legalities and postcolonial citizenships negotiated at the level of the 
every day state に appear to have resonance for this work. Perhaps drawing them 
into some kind of resolution to the criminal tribes question might provide a pointer 
towards the value of studying postcolonial penalities. 
 
One thing appears quite clearly from the detailed analysis of the criminal tribes 
policyげゲ ヮﾗゲデIﾗﾉﾗﾐｷ;ﾉ ﾉｷaW reported here. It is that Indiansげ I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ デﾗ claim or 
negotiate important citizenship rights in the critical founding moments of the new 
nation state was crucially and fundamentally undercut by something. In seeking to 
understand what that something ┘;ゲ デｴW ゲデ┌S┞ ｴ;ゲ aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘WS NW┘Hｷｪｷﾐげゲ ふヲヰヱヴぶ 
injunction to reimagine postcolonial citizenship as something more than the tabula 
rasa that a focus upon the Indian Constitution and charter of Fundamental Rights 
┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデく HWヴ ﾐﾗデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐIW ﾗa けヮヴW-existing debates and social 
ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWゲげ ふNewbigin, 2014: 37) has been borne out in the evidence related earlier, 
ranging from the reliance upon canonical colonial texts of governance (such as 
criminal tribes administration manuals) to the habitus of those who were 
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interviewed by the Enquiry Committee and who Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷI;デWS ﾉﾗI;ﾉ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデゲげ 
views to it. Yet we are still left with a question: Why were the liberty rights of Indians 
felt to be so easily divisible and a secondary citizenship status for certain 
communities (of largely un-consulted, un-named individuals) felt so necessary? 
 
That question will reward further study. But one possibility is suggested in the work 
of Mithi Mukherjee (2010) and it leads us, paradoxically perhaps, back to the Indian 
Constitution. For although the constitution is broadly seen as a document of 
freedom, Mukherjee (2010: 185) draws attention to the fact that its preamble に 
contaｷﾐｷﾐｪ ;ゲ ｷデ SﾗWゲ けデｴW ヮｴｷﾉﾗゲﾗヮｴ┞ ﾗa デｴW Cﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ aヴ;ﾏWヴゲげ に in fact establishes 
a rather unexpected formulation of such freedom. The preamble, she observes, 
establishes け; ﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆ ﾗa ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ I;デWｪﾗヴｷWゲ ｴｷWヴ;ヴIｴｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ﾗヴSWヴWS ;ﾐS ﾏW;ﾐデ デﾗ 
guide the constitution makers and future legislators in their decisionsげ ふMukherjee, 
2010: 185). Importantly, justice precedes both liberty and equality in this hierarchy. 
Such ordering was no mere philosophical fancy either. Part IV of the Constitution, 
titled the Directive Principles of State Policy, sets out the primacy of justice as the 
sovereign principle of the Indian legislature and directs the manner of its 
instantiation in legislative practice. Mukherjee goes on to quote a speech given by 
Nehru in the Lok Sabha, the Indian Parliament, wherein he noted the 
ｷﾐIﾗﾏﾏWﾐゲ┌ヴ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa ﾃ┌ゲデｷIW ;ﾐS aヴWWSﾗﾏが ;SSｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ けｷデ ｷゲ ┌ヮ デﾗ P;ヴﾉｷ;ﾏWﾐデ デﾗ 
remove the contradiction and make fundamental rights subserve the Directive 
PヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉWゲ ﾗa “デ;デW PﾗﾉｷI┞げ ふIｷデWS ｷﾐ M┌ﾆｴWヴﾃWW ヲヰヱ0: 198, her emphasis). 
 
Mukherjee suggests a continuity and familial resemblance between the nineteenth 
century authoritarian liberalism of figures like J.F. Stephen and postcolonial 
conceptions of けjusticeげ as that which gives effect to national priorities above 
abstract principles. Iﾐ デｴW ﾐW┘ IﾐSｷ;が ゲｴW ;ヴｪ┌Wゲが けｷデ ┘;ゲ デｴW ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW 
Parliament に like the British colonial state before it に that would be the primary 
agent of a new ゲﾗIｷWデ┞げ ふMukherjee 2010: 199). There is certainly merit in this 
argument. In both, coercion is a legitimate means of government. For Stephen 
(1874: 166), it finds philosophical support in the prima facie validity of his argument 
that けヮﾗ┘Wヴ ヮヴWIWSWゲ ﾉｷHWヴデ┞ に that liberty, from the very nature of things, is 
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dependent upon power; and it is only under the protection of a powerful, well-
organised, and intelligent government that aﾐ┞ ﾉｷHWヴデ┞ I;ﾐ W┝ｷゲデ ;デ ;ﾉﾉげく For the 
Nehruvian architects of a new India, for whom independence represented 
something like a permanent staデW ﾗa WﾏWヴｪWﾐI┞が デｴW ﾃ┌ゲデｷIW ﾗa G;ﾐSｴｷ;ﾐ け┌ヮﾉｷaデげ ;ﾐS 
broadly based social democracy would require the trump card of coercion. Property 
rights would need to be qualified in order to achieve land reform. The absolute right 
to equality would need to be mediated to achieve substantive equality for socially 
subordinate tribes and classes, and so on. 
 
What was perhaps less anticipated by Indian socialists and claimants of a full and 
genuine independence was the difficulty that containing these coercive impulses 
would pose. Moreover, since there never was a complete schism with the past, late-
colonial tendencies mixed in possibly unexpected ways with this coercive 
government. Since at least the 1920s, for example, colonial policy had increasingly 
sought to effect welfare goals through the machinery of policing, drawing together 
criminal tribes with other けSWヮヴWゲゲWSげ Iﾉ;ゲゲWゲ worthy of state attention and 
assistance: aboriginals, hill-tribes, untouchables and the like. Thus, デｴW ゲデ;デWげゲ duty 
of care responsibilities had come to be imagined and enmeshed with structures that 
were fundamentally coercive and illiberal in nature. Drawing all of this together goes 
some way to explaining why in 1949-50, in the immediate shadow of independence, 
the Enquiry Committee opted for coercion rather than freedom for criminal tribes, 
recommending the repeal of the Criminal Tribes Act but its immediate replacement 
with an habitual offender law.  
 
Shortly after, the Indian Parliament did just that, repealing the one and in its place 
passing the Habitual Offenders (Control and Reform) Act 1952. Under section 2 (1) 
(c) of that statute members of the formerly notified criminal tribes came to be 
associated with an alternative but seemingly no less powerful nor stigmatizing 
monikerが けSWﾐﾗデｷaｷWS デヴｷHWゲげが ﾗヴ DNTゲ ;ゲ デｴW┞ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ヴWaWヴヴWS デﾗ ｷﾐ ﾏﾗSWヴﾐ IﾐSｷ;ﾐ 
parlance. The sequelae of this labelling have included a host of social and economic 
handicaps as well as a long record of violence and abuse at the hands higher caste 
groups and frequently state officials. More recently, there is evidence of certain 
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denotified tribes reversing this relationship of subjection and striking out in 
increasingly politicised forms of organised violence (Chaturvedi, 2011). As recently as 
2007 the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
ヴWｪｷゲデWヴWS ｷデゲ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ けデｴ;デ デｴW ゲﾗ-called denotified and nomadic tribes, which were 
ﾉｷゲデWS aﾗヴ デｴWｷヴ ;ﾉﾉWｪWS さIヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ デWﾐSWﾐIｷWゲざ ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW aﾗヴﾏWヴ Cヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉ TヴｷHWゲ AIデ 
ふヱΒΑヱぶが Iﾗﾐデｷﾐ┌W デﾗ HW ゲデｷｪﾏ;デｷ┣WS ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW H;Hｷデ┌;ﾉ OaaWﾐSWヴゲ AIデ ふヱΓヵヲぶげ 
(UNCERD, 2007: 1). In submissions made to the Committee at the time, welfare and 
advocacy organisations estimated the number of Indian citizens subject to these 
debilitations to be in the order of 20 million (Resist Initiative International, 2007) and 
catalogued a range of fundamental rights unavailable to them or diminished by their 
status (National Network for Human Rights Treaty Monitoring in India, 2007). 
Clearly, then, understanding the manner in which effective transitions to full rights-
bearing citizenship may be achieved is something of profound importance. But if this 
article has illustrated anything, it is the complexity of the postcolonial condition and 
the sheer scope and scale of measures visited upon individuals and communities 
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1
 The Report of the Criminal Tribes Act Enquiry Committee calculated the pre-
independence numbers of those residing within the post-independence territorial 
boundaries of India at just below three million. No estimates exist of numbers in the 
previously populous (in criminal tribes terms) areas of western Punjab and eastern 
Bengal, or in other areas ceded to the new state of Pakistan. Verma (2002) puts the 
figure at 13 million but gives no citation for it nor any description of its estimation. 
2
 TｴW デWヴﾏ けﾉﾗI;ﾉ ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげ ｷゲ ┌ゲWS ｷﾐ ｷデゲ IﾐSｷ;ﾐ IﾗﾐデW┝デ デﾗ ヴWaWヴ デﾗ ゲデ;デW ﾗヴ 
provincial governments and legislatures. They were akin to state governments in the 
USA today. 
3
 There is now a burgeoning academic literature on the subject. I review most of this 
in my book Penal Power and Colonial Rule (Brown, 2014) which, together with 
Chaturvedi (2011) and Schwartz (2010) will provide a comprehensive bibliography on 
the topic. Non-academic texts of some starkly varying quality include Bhadauria 
(1996), Dげ“ﾗ┌┣; ふヲヰヰヱぶが L;ﾉｷデ; ふヱΓΓヵぶ ;ﾐS “ｷﾐｪｴ ふヲヰヱヰぶく 
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 National Archive of India (NAI), Government of India (GOI) Legislative Proceedings, 
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words are generally and mistakenly attributed to Stephen. They belong to a Mr 
Nembhard, the Commissioner of East Berar. There is much confusion in the 
contemporary Indian non-;I;SWﾏｷI ﾉｷデWヴ;デ┌ヴW ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW AIデく Dげ“ﾗ┌┣; 
(2001) is often cited as the best and most important contemporary source, yet his 
account is replete with gross factual errors and highly unusual historical claims. 
5
 NAI GOI Legislative Proceedings, Nov 1871, No. 76(A). 
6
 NAI GOI Legislative Proceedings, Nov 1871, No. 58 (A). 
7
 NAI GOI Legislative Proceedings, Nov 1871, No. 74 (A). 
8
 The tenor and divisions of this debate also reflected fundamental differences 
within nineteenth century liberalism that might be roughly characterised as between 
けﾗヴデｴﾗSﾗ┝げ ;ﾐS け;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ;ヴｷ;ﾐげ ┗ｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa ヮWヴゲﾗﾐ;ﾉ aヴWWSﾗﾏ ;ﾐS ゲデ;デW ;┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞く “WW 
generally Brown (2014, Ch. 5) and Mehta (1999). 
9
 NAI GOI (Home に Judicial) July 1872 No. 97 (A). 
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 India Office Records, British Library (IOR) GOI L/P&J/6/423 No.1038. 
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 For a broader account of the colonial experience of forest dwelling tribes, some of 
whom, such as the Bhils, were drawn into the control mechanisms of the Criminal 
Tribes Act, see Skaria (1999). 
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